

ARTICLE

How UN peacekeeping missions enforce peace agreements

Cameron Mailhot 

Department of Political Science, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas, USA

Correspondence

Cameron Mailhot, Department of Political Science, University of Arkansas, 428 Old Main, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, NC 72701, USA.
Email: cmailhot@uark.edu

Abstract

How do UN peacekeeping missions enforce peace agreements, and what effect do higher rates of enforcement have on agreement implementation and conflict termination? Peace agreement enforcement forms a central component of peacekeeping effectiveness, yet missions are often mandated to enforce a minority of agreement provisions, and they vary across both time and space in the ways in which they do so. I identify the three dimensions along which enforcement operates—the proportion and type of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, alongside their mandated level of involvement in their implementation—and theorize about their positive effects on agreement implementation and conflict termination. Analyzing the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset, an original data set of the enforcement patterns of all UN peacekeeping missions (1989–2015), I find that each dimension of enforcement has, at various time points, a distinct impact on agreement implementation and preventing conflict recidivism.

Civil wars commonly come to an end through the adoption of comprehensive peace agreements (“peace agreement” or “agreement”) (Kreutz, 2010). Agreement adoption represents a significant moment in a country’s transition from war to peace: Not only are these agreements the result of years of sustained negotiation among warring parties, but they also depart from traditional cease-fire agreements to include an array of provisions¹ committing the signatories and post-conflict society to processes of economic, political, and social reform in order to address the structural causes of conflict (Mac Ginty et al., 2019; Walter, 1999). Tajikistan’s 1997 General Agreement, for example, which sought to bring the country’s five-year civil war to a permanent end, included provisions not just for instituting an immediate cease-fire but also for transforming the country’s media system and reforming its judiciary, military, and police (United Nations General Assembly 1997).

These agreements are arduous to implement. Consequently, the United Nations (UN) regularly deploys peacekeeping missions (“missions”) to enforce the process (Joshi, 2013; Stedman et al., 2002). Previous scholarship on UN missions has demonstrated their robust effectiveness in reducing violence and ending conflict (Di Salvatore, 2019; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fjelde et al., 2019; Fortna, 2004a, 2008; Hegre et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2016; Kathman & Benson, 2019). Their effectiveness relies, in no small part, on the enforcement of these agreements (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004a, 2008; Joshi et al., 2017; Maekawa et al., 2019; Mattes & Savun, 2010; Stedman, 1997; Walter, 1997, 2002). Indeed, the vast majority (82%) of post–Cold War missions’ mandates make explicit reference to the enforcement of peace agreements—including those for the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and the corresponding General Agreement.² However, these studies often (implicitly or explicitly) treat the enforcement of peace agreements and their constitutive provisions as a homogenous condition, yet missions are

Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NBIKED>.

¹ Provisions are “goal-oriented reform[s] or stipulation[s] [in an agreement] that [are] costly to one or [more] actors, falling under relatively discrete policy domain[s]” (Joshi et al., 2015, 1).

² Per the author’s analyses.

rarely mandated to enforce³ peace agreements in their entirety, instead being mandated to enforce, on average, a minority (45%) of agreement provisions at any given time.⁴ UNMOT was mandated, for example, to enforce the agreement's cease-fire and dispute resolution provisions, yet it was *not* mandated to enforce the agreement's judicial, media, military, or police reform provisions. If peacekeeping enforcement is crucial both to agreement implementation and conflict termination (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004b, 2008; Joshi et al., 2017; Stedman, 1997; Walter, 2002),⁵ how do missions actually enforce peace agreements, and what effect do higher rates of mandated enforcement have on agreement implementation and patterns of armed conflict?

Whereas past scholarship has given broad classifications to the different purposes that missions can serve (e.g., Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Joshi, 2013), recent scholarship has begun to study the activities of missions (Blair et al., 2022; Diehl & Druckman, 2018; Di Salvatore et al., 2022; Lloyd, 2021). However, nuance and variation in the peace agreement enforcement practices of missions remain largely underexplored in both research agendas. As such, much remains to be understood, theoretically and empirically, about how mission enforcement of peace agreements operates in practice and the downstream effects of variation therein.

I answer these questions in three steps. First, I identify missions' mandated enforcement patterns along three dimensions: (1) the *proportion* of peace agreement provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, (2) the *types* of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, and (3) the *level* of missions' mandated involvement in the provision implementation process. These dimensions, I demonstrate, capture the primary dimensions along which missions are empirically mandated to enforce peace agreements. Second, I theorize about the independent, positive impact that these dimensions of enforcement have on agreement implementation and conflict termination, including the mediating role of the former on the latter.

Third, I test my claims by leveraging insights from the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset (Mailhot, 2023). Moving beyond past efforts to map the characteristics and practices of missions, this time-series cross-sectional data set identifies, in detail, patterns of

continuity and change along the three primary dimensions of peace agreement enforcement—the proportion and type of provisions that missions enforce, alongside their level of involvement in the implementation process—for *all* UN peacekeeping missions deployed between 1989 and 2015. Consistent with my argument, I find that both the mandated enforcement of more peace agreement provisions and more direct forms of involvement are positively and statistically significantly associated with peace agreement implementation—especially in the early post-conflict period. However, I find that the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict termination is independently insignificant, yet the impact of the mandated enforcement of specific types of provisions—here, security-oriented provisions—and conflict recidivism is significantly mediated by peace agreement implementation itself. These results suggest that missions may be most impactful when they prioritize the enforcement of more of the provisions in peace agreements and engage in deeper, more direct forms of involvement in the early post-conflict period. Moreover, while they imply that higher levels of peace agreement enforcement may not reliably contribute to bringing about a durable end to armed conflict, these findings also reinforce others' assessments that conflict termination necessarily depends upon the commitments made by the warring parties (Bell & Badanjak, 2019). Taken together, these results demonstrate the unique, divergent impact that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on two key outcomes of normative importance to researchers, practitioners, and policymakers. I employ multiple estimation strategies, including two-way fixed effects, and conduct additional analyses to help address the various biases and endogeneity concerns that often accompany the study of peacekeeping, peace agreements, and post-conflict peace.

Ultimately, this article draws attention to and empirically examines a set of crucial—but heretofore underspecified—sources of theoretical and empirical variation linking UN peacekeeping missions to peace agreement implementation and patterns of armed conflict. In doing so, it both expands our understanding of how peace agreement enforcement operates and provides researchers, policymakers, and practitioners with a clearer sense of the processes through which missions may effectively contribute to the post-conflict peace process.

PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF PEACE AGREEMENTS

Established scholarship has consistently demonstrated that UN peacekeeping missions play a crucial role in the enforcement of peace agreements.

³ Throughout this article, I use the term *mandated enforcement* to refer to the directive of a mission to engage in a particular provision activity to promote its fulfillment. Crucially, I use the qualifying term *mandated* because *enforcement*, when used on its own, implies achievement or fulfillment.

⁴ Derived from the author's original data. See below.

⁵ More specifically, this refers to armed conflict among the major warring parties. Although it only represents one conceptualization and measurement of peace (Höglund and Kovacs 2010), conflict termination is one of the primary outcomes that peace agreements and UN missions aim to achieve.

First, past research has drawn our attention to the immense difficulties that warring parties face in credibly committing both to agreement implementation and conflict termination without confirmation that their opponents will act accordingly (Fearon, 1995; Reiter, 2009). This research agenda argues that missions can serve to enforce peace agreements by observing the activities of the agreement signatories and imposing material (e.g., sanctions, casualties) or immaterial (e.g., audience costs, social capital) costs if they renege on their end of the bargain (Fortna, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Howard, 2019; Hultman et al., 2016; Joshi, 2013; Matanock, 2020). In doing so, they offer various guarantees to the warring parties, thereby reducing the insecurities they face in transitioning out of conflict and increasing the costs of defection (Quinn et al., 2007).

Second, established scholarship has also demonstrated that peacekeeping missions play a crucial role in the enforcement of peace agreements by assisting in the implementation process itself. Here, missions provide the support necessary to overcome the obstacles of implementing agreements (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Huber & Karim, 2018; Joshi & Quinn, 2017; Stanley & Holiday, 1997), especially in contexts where warring parties may desire change but lack the capacity or political capital (Maekawa et al., 2019). Consequently, peacekeeping missions reduce the direct costs of the warring parties engaging in the peace process, increasing their ability and likelihood of doing so.

These efforts to theorize and empirically examine mission effectiveness are invaluable. As Walter et al. (2021) remind us, missions are *extraordinarily* successful at reducing and preventing conflict, and the repeated focus on the enforcement of peace agreements to do so cannot be understated (e.g., Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2003, 2008; Joshi et al., 2017; Walter, 1997, 2002). However, this scholarship often overlooks the degree to which missions actually enforce peace agreements. By focusing, importantly, on variation in mission type, mission personnel characteristics, or separate activities of missions altogether, this research agenda often treats agreement enforcement as uniform and consistent: Either missions are deployed to enforce a peace agreement in its entirety, or they are not.

Indeed, this presumption is not without a degree of rhetorical basis. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 729 (1992), for example, states that the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador's (ONUSAL) primary objective is the “*verification and monitoring of the implementation of all of the agreements* [Chapultepec Peace Accords].”⁶ Yet while the accords included provisions for rebuilding the country's media

and education system, implementing an economic development program, and reforming public services, the same resolution mandated that ONUSAL initially enforce a separate subset of the agreement's provisions: a cease-fire arrangement, a restructuring of the Salvadoran security sector and judiciary, and a reforming of the country's electoral system. Thus, what we miss when we treat enforcement as a fixed condition applied to peace agreements as a whole—and not a highly variant process applied at the level of agreements' individual, constitutive provisions—is (1) a nuanced understanding of the dimensions along which enforcement varies empirically and, consequently, (2) a greater appreciation of the ways in which such variation affects two key outcomes: agreement implementation and conflict termination.

DIMENSIONS OF ENFORCEMENT, AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

My point of departure is this empirical variation in the enforcement practices of peacekeeping missions. In this section, I explicate and theorize about the ways in which each of these three dimensions of enforcement—(1) the *proportion* of provisions mandated to be enforced, (2) the *type* of provisions mandated to be enforced, and (3) the *level* of mandated involvement—contributes to agreement implementation and the prevention of conflict recidivism.

Dimension I: Proportion of provisions mandated to be enforced

The first dimension of enforcement is the proportion of provisions missions are mandated to enforce. Missions may be mandated to enforce a small proportion of agreement provisions; the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was mandated throughout much of the 1990s to enforce one of the 18 provisions in the 1989 Taif Accord (6%). They may also be mandated to enforce higher proportions of agreement provisions; the United Nations Operation in Mozambique was mandated at different times to enforce 12 of the 24 provisions in the 1992 General Peace Agreement (50%).

Because enforcement can shift warring parties' incentives and behavior, there is reason to expect the proportion of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce to play an important role in the agreement implementation process. Missions may coerce warring parties to enact change (Howard, 2019). This was the case of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, which maintained the authority to dismiss local officials working in the institutions whose reform

⁶ Boldface and italics are added for emphasis.

provisions it was mandated to enforce (Wang, 1996, 18). Missions may also induce actors to implement more provisions by providing material or immaterial incentives (e.g., employment opportunities or political resources; Fortna, 2008, 92). The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) had committed the major warring factions to the peace process with its enforcement of a power-sharing arrangement (Day, 2000). Missions may enforce provisions by transforming warring parties' beliefs and perceptions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 900; Howard, 2019). In El Salvador, ONUSAL enforced the implementation of the accords' police reform provision by persuading officials of the necessity of a professional, integrated police force detached from the wartime security institutions (Stanley 1999, 120–121).

Missions that are mandated to enforce more peace agreements are in a better position to influence the behavior of warring parties across a greater proportion of provisions, bringing the parties more in line with the agreement's obligations. They can confirm more instances of implementation commitment (or reneging) and reward (or punish) parties accordingly. Thus, my first hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 1a (Dimension I). The higher the proportion of peace agreement provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the higher the rate of peace agreement implementation.

Dimension II: The mandated enforcement of specific types of provisions

By their very inclusion in peace agreements, each provision is believed to contribute to the peace process. However, different *types* of provisions may vary in the ways in which they do so. For example, provisions for economic development and the promotion of women's rights aim to restructure the country's political, economic, and social system to establish the conditions that make conflict recidivism unlikely in the long run. However, security-oriented provisions pertaining, for example, to demobilization and power sharing can serve to address many of the first-order concerns combatants face while participating in the agreement implementation process.

First, security-oriented provisions address the immediate security concerns of the warring parties by forcing them to engage in threat-reducing processes. Although other types of provision arrangements, such as media and education reform, may set the stage for peace, in the long run, security-oriented reforms tie the hands of the warring parties (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008) by asking them to put down their arms or demobilize their combatants. In this way, they help set the stage for agreement implementation and the broader

peace process to develop, in the immediate term, by helping to address the insecurities that the warring parties face while participating in the process.

Second, security-oriented provisions also help to address political legitimacy concerns. Peace agreements are contentious, with members of the warring parties often questioning their utility and benefits. By allowing warring parties to gain a foothold in the post-conflict political arena, security-oriented provisions—especially those relating to political-institutional arrangements—help to legitimate the peace agreement and broader peace process (Joshi et al., 2017). When these actors perceive the agreement and peace process as legitimate, they are more likely to engage with them.

While security-oriented provisions help build the conditions for agreement implementation, peacekeeping missions provide the crucial backing—but only when mandated to do so. Missions develop transparent means of gathering and sharing information on the warring parties' activities, and they can protect warring parties when implementing these security-oriented provisions (Walter, 1999). They can also absorb much of the political fallout when the warring parties engage with contentious security-oriented provisions (Huber & Karim, 2018). These practices describe an array of missions, including the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN; UNSC, 2007b), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, UNSC 2004b), and the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI; UNSC, 2004a).

Ultimately, the types of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce may have a differential effect on the broader implementation process. Based on this discussion, I put forth the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a (Dimension II). The more security-oriented provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the higher the rate of peace agreement implementation.

Dimension III: Level of involvement in the provision implementation process

The third dimension of mandated enforcement is the *level* to which missions are involved in the provision implementation process. More specifically, missions may be either *indirectly* or *directly* involved in the implementation process; whereas the former represents hands-off observing or witnessing of the implementation process, the latter dictates that the mission actively partake in the implementation process. There are three ways in which this dimension varies, empirically, across time and space.

First, a mission can vary its level of involvement in implementing *different* provisions *at the same time*. For example, UNMOT was mandated in 1997 to

“**monitor** the assembly of [United Tajik Opposition] fighters and their...disarmament” while also “**assist[ing]** in the reintegration into government power structures or demobilization of ex-combatants” (UNSC, 1997).⁷ Here, UNMOT was indirectly involved (via *monitoring*) in implementing the disarmament provisions of Tajikistan’s 1997 General Agreement and directly involved (via *assisting*) in implementing the agreement’s demobilization and reintegration provisions.

Second, missions may vary their level of involvement in implementing the *same* provision *at different times*. An example is the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the UNMIBH, and the Dayton Accords’ human rights provision. In its final mandate, UNPROFOR relied on indirect forms of enforcement by praising “the parties’ commitment, as specified in the Peace Agreement, to securing...the highest level of internationally recognized human rights” (UNSC, 1995a). In contrast, when it took over for UNPROFOR a week later, UNMIBH was mandated to *work closely with* Bosnia’s new Human Rights Commission to enforce the agreement’s human rights provision (UNSC, 1995b). This represents a more direct form of engagement.

Third, *different* missions can vary in their level of involvement in implementing the *same* types of provisions *at the same time*. A clear example is UNMIN’s and UNOCI’s mandated enforcement of the disarmament provisions in, respectively, the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (2007). In its initial mandate, UNMIN was required to enforce the disarmament of the Maoist rebels and Nepalese forces by “**monitoring** the management of arms and armed personnel...in line with the provisions of the [CPA]” (UNSC, 2007b). In contrast, UNOCI’s mandate, extended just two weeks earlier, included enforcement of the disarmament provision by “**assisting** the Government of Côte d’Ivoire in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and...their disarmament” (UNSC, 2007a). Whereas the former mandate (i.e., *monitor*) exhibits a passive, indirect level of involvement with combatant disarmament, the latter mandate (i.e., *assist*) adopts a more active, direct level of involvement.

More direct forms of involvement may improve agreement implementation for two reasons. First, agreement signatories may genuinely desire to implement provisions yet lack the expertise or capacity to do so. Missions that are more directly involved in the implementation process—for example, ones that *administer* (vs. *monitor*) the process—can help governments overcome such challenges by providing the resources necessary for implementation (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Maekawa et al., 2019). A clear

instance is UNMIL, which was authorized for 14 years to *administer*, with nearly 5 billion USD and 14,000 personnel (Mailhot et al., 2022), the police reform provision in the Accra Peace Agreement.

Second, deeper involvement can better mitigate the parties’ credible commitment problems. Indirect forms of engagement (e.g., *report*, *verify*) improve the chances of agreement implementation because of the ability of information sharing to impact public and private support for the warring parties. However, these forms of involvement may still allow for a degree of renegeing. Take, for example, UNMIN’s verification of the CPA’s disarmament provision. In May 2009, Nepal’s then-interim prime minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, was able to deceive UNMIN of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) troop totals: By self-reporting a reduction in personnel totals from 35,000 to 20,000 combatants, the PLA maintained its true personnel total (8000) while also appearing to comply with the proportional reduction component of the disarmament provision (*India Today*, 2009). Indeed, indirect involvement—here, *verification*—had promoted a minimum degree of rhetorical compliance but fell short of ensuring complete implementation. A more direct form of involvement, such as *administering*, may have better mitigated deception, thereby ensuring a higher rate of implementation. My third hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 3a (Dimension III). The more directly involved missions are mandated to be in the implementation of peace agreement provisions, the higher the rate of peace agreement implementation.

Mandated enforcement and the prevention of conflict recidivism

While I have focused thus far on agreement implementation as the primary outcome, each dimension of mandated enforcement may also have an impact on the conflict dynamics among agreement signatories. By being mandated to enforce a higher proportion of peace agreement provisions (Dimension I) or involving themselves more directly in the implementation process (Dimension III), missions are better positioned to force the warring parties to offer costly concessions (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008), provide security guarantees (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003, 2007), and institutionalize stability- and equality-promoting measures (Mac Ginty et al., 2019; Walter, 1997). Each of these procedures reduces the chances of conflict recidivism by diverting attention and resources away from conflict, thereby increasing both the costs of war and the benefits of channeling conflict through political institutions.

The impact of peacekeeping missions may be particularly true when it comes to the mandated

⁷ Boldface and italics are added for emphasis.

enforcement of security-oriented provisions (Dimension II). Because one-sided disarmament, combined with first-strike advantages, open up former combatants to tremendous vulnerability (Fearon, 1995), the warring parties often face heightened insecurities transitioning out of armed conflict (Reiter, 2009). Security-oriented provisions in both spheres are thus especially crucial for mitigating challenges to durably ending armed conflict (Joshi et al., 2015). When missions are mandated to enforce such provisions, they provide an additional layer of accountability and protection, reducing the likelihood of conflict recidivism (Quinn et al., 2007; Stedman, 1997; Walter, 1997, 2002).

Based on this discussion, I put forth the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1b (Dimension I). The higher the proportion of peace agreement provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the longer the time period without conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.

Hypothesis 2b (Dimension II). The more security-oriented provisions that missions are mandated to enforce, the longer the time period without conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.

Hypothesis 3b (Dimension III). The more directly involved missions are mandated to be in the implementation of peace agreement provisions, the longer the time period without conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.

Because peace agreements are adopted by warring parties, and the warring parties ultimately determine instances of conflict recidivism (Bell & Badanjak, 2019; Joshi & Quinn, 2017), agreement implementation itself is often an important determinant of conflict termination (Joshi & Quinn, 2017). In these contexts, peacekeeping missions promote peace agreement implementation, which, in turn, helps prevent the return of armed conflict. Thus, while the three dimensions of mandated enforcement may contribute directly to preventing conflict recidivism, they may be particularly impactful when they operate *through* the agreement implementation process itself. My final hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 4 (Agreement Implementation Mediation). Peace agreement implementation mediates the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict recidivism among agreement signatories.

RESEARCH DESIGN

I test these hypotheses by combining data on peace agreements and armed conflict with an original, comprehensive data set on the mandated enforce-

ment practices of *all* UN peacekeeping missions (1989–2015). I briefly discuss the former before describing the structure of the latter and their collection process.

Outcome I: Peace agreement implementation

Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a examine the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation. These claims rely on the ability to disaggregate peace agreements into their constitutive provisions and identify the rate of implementation because, as I demonstrate, enforcement is applied first and foremost to individual provisions.

To identify provisions and operationalize implementation, I rely on the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), a data set of the 34 comprehensive peace agreements adopted between 1989 and 2015 (Appendix A, p. 2). This data set is extensive, also identifying the presence of up to 51 unique types of peace agreement provisions (Appendix A, p. 3) that address an array of economic, political, and social issues related directly or indirectly to armed conflicts (e.g., cease-fires, police reform, minority rights; Joshi & Darby, 2013).

I use this data set to construct a composite measurement of each agreement's implementation rate by summing the implementation scores for each individual provision and dividing this value by the maximum implementation score possible (3; "full implementation").⁸

This creates a standardized score at the agreement-year level that is comparable across both time and agreement. While the average agreement experiences an implementation rate of 76% a decade following adoption, there is significant variation: The Chapultepec Peace Accords (El Salvador) has an implementation rate of 96%, whereas the Memorandum of Settlement (India) has an implementation rate of 24%. Figure 1 maps the annual implementation score for five agreements.

Outcome II: Conflict recidivism

The fundamental purpose of agreement enforcement is to bring a durable end to armed conflict among its signatories (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2008). Relying on data from UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson et al., 2021), I measure the return of armed conflict between agreement signatories annually as either minor or major conflict (25 or more

⁸ The maximum implementation score is equal to the total number of provisions in the agreement, multiplied by 3 (full implementation). For instance, with 15 provisions, Bangladesh's 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord has a maximum possible implementation score of $15 \times 3 = 45$ (Joshi et al., 2015).




FIGURE 1 Implementation of five agreements. *Note:* Peace agreement implementation varies over time and from one agreement to the next.

annual battle-related deaths). Operationalizing armed conflict this way follows established practice (Hegre et al., 2019). These observations are necessarily made at the agreement-year level. Because peace agreements may be signed at any point throughout the year, I allow peace to “survive” in the year in which the agreement is signed (Joshi & Quinn, 2017).

Measuring each dimension of agreement enforcement: The peacekeeping enforcement data set

The three dimensions of enforcement are (1) the *proportion* of provisions missions are mandated to enforce, (2) the *type* of provisions missions are mandated to enforce, and (3) the *level* of mandated involvement in the implementation process. Indeed, a nascent body of scholarship has begun to map the activities in which missions engage, yet they are not without their limitations. Di Salvatore et al. (2022) have compiled a data set of (up to) 41 different activities in which UN missions engage between 1989 and 2017. However, these data exclude activities related to the content of agreements. Furthermore, by including only a subset of missions in Africa, their data omit the nearly two dozen additional missions deployed to enforce peace agreements on other continents. Lloyd’s (2021) data are even more ambitious, identifying (up to) 51 different tasks performed by over 70 missions between 1948 and 2015. Nevertheless, this data set includes only one variable for a peace agreement enforcement mandate.⁹

To overcome these shortcomings, I rely on the first systematic data set identifying the mandated enforce-

ment practices of *all* UN peacekeeping missions deployed between 1989 and 2015: the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset (Mailhot, 2023). The construction of this original time-series cross-sectional data set relied on a multistep process. First, I identified all peacekeeping missions deployed with a mandate to enforce one of the 34 comprehensive peace agreements in the data (Appendix A, p. 4). This authorization often appears in the mandates establishing missions (e.g., UNMIL) or in the peace agreements themselves (e.g., UNMIBH). Overall, 56% of agreements (19 of 34) are enforced by a mission for any amount of time.

Second, I gathered information on the mandated enforcement practices of each mission. This process relied on a careful analysis of all UNSC resolutions and associated authoritative documents establishing, extending, restructuring, or providing further clarification on the activities of UN missions.¹⁰ A mission is coded as being mandated to enforce a given provision if it is directed to be involved with that specific provision. For example, UNSC Resolution 1561 (September 2004) authorized UNMIL to “assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia,” and UNMIL immediately thereafter deployed civilian and police personnel to assist the Liberians in police reform. Thus, UNMIL is coded as being mandated to enforce the police reform provision of the Accra Peace Agreement at that time. I also include for each observation a corresponding measurement of the level of mission involvement in the implementation process. As previously noted, missions are mandated to enforce agreement provisions through a variety of procedures; for example, they may “*monitor* the ceasefire agreement”¹¹ or “*assist* the government...in implementing... disarmament.”^{12,13} These represent distinct levels of involvement. In line with my theorization and with confirmation from reports on missions’ activities, I create a standardized ordinal measurement of the level of mission involvement in the provision implementation process: *no involvement* (0), *indirect involvement* (1), and *direct involvement* (2). Table 1 provides a summary of the actions and the corresponding levels of involvement.

Because the mandated enforcement practices of missions can change over time, this data set also captures temporal variation for each dimension. As Table 2 highlights, UNSC Resolution 1924 (2010) authorizes UNOCI to “support...the disarmament and dismantling of militias.” This demonstrates direct

⁹ Dorussen and Gizelis’s (2013) and Diehl and Druckman’s (2018) data either capture a small number of mission activities or fail to disaggregate them in ways meaningful for capturing the dimensions of enforcement.

¹⁰ These include, for example, Secretary General reports, UN General Assembly resolutions and peace agreements themselves. These additional documents provide a more complete picture of the provisions that missions are mandated to enforce.

¹¹ UNMIN, UNSC Resolution 1740 (January 2007).

¹² UNOCI, UNSC Resolution 2112 (July 2013).

¹³ Boldface and italics are added for emphasis.

TABLE 1 Dimension III: actions and corresponding levels of involvement.

Mandated level of involvement		Actions			
Indirect involvement	Investigate	Maintain contract	Monitor	Observe	Report
	Verify				
Direct involvement	Advise	Assist	Contribute	Coordinate	Ensure
	Facilitate	Guide	Organize	Oversee	Participate
	Promote	Protect	Supervise	Support	

Note: UN peacekeeping missions engage in different levels of provision enforcement (indirect involvement and direct involvement) through different actions.

TABLE 2 Temporal changes in dimensions I and II in UNOCI's mandated enforcement of two provisions within the Ouagadougou Political Agreement: civil administrative reform and disarmament.

Mandate	Dimension I: civil admin- istration reform	Dimension III: civil administration reform	Civil administration reform mandate text	Dimension I: disarmament	Dimension III: disarmament	Disarmament mandate text
UNSC Resolu- tion 1924 (2010)	0	0	-	1	2 (Direct involvement)	“Support...the disarmament and dismantling”
UNSC Resolu- tion 2000 (2011)	1	2 (Direct involvement)	“Support the Ivorian authorities to extend and re-establish effective state administration and strengthen public administration”	1	2 (Direct involvement)	“Assist the Gov- ernment...in developing and implement- ing...a new national programme for the disarmament”

Note: Bold is added for emphasis. As these two mandates for UNOCI demonstrate, UN peacekeeping missions vary their mandated enforcement activities (Dimension I) and mandated level of involvement (Dimension III) over time. Scores for dimension I are dichotomous measurements; scores for dimension II are ordinal measurements for mandated levels of involvement: 1 for indirect involvement and 2 for direct involvement.

involvement in the disarmament provision of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement. Just one year later, the UNSC expanded UNOCI's mandate by requesting that it also “support the Ivorian authorities to extend and re-establish effective State administration” (UNSC, 2011). This corresponds to the civil administration reform provision of the agreement.

With this information, I am able to calculate each of the three dimensions of mandated enforcement. For Dimension I, I create an aggregate rate by summing the total number of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce and dividing this value by the total number of provisions in the agreement. This creates a proportion that is comparable across time and space. Dimension II focuses on the *type* of provisions that missions are mandated to enforce—here, provisions promoting the physical and political security of the warring parties. Relying on the coding processes for Dimension I, I created a proportional index of the total annual number of (temporally proximate) security-oriented provisions that missions are man-

dated to enforce: cease-fires, disarmament, demobilization, territorial power sharing, transitional power sharing, reintegration, and withdrawal (Fortna, 2004c; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Joshi et al., 2015; Mattes & Savun, 2009). To create an aggregate measurement of involvement (Dimension III), I sum the annual total level of involvement for each agreement provision in a mission's mandate and divide this value by the total number of provisions in the agreement.

As an example, Figure 2 presents the scores for each of the three dimensions for UNMOT in Tajikistan. As we can see, there are clear patterns of continuity and change over time. For instance, UNMOT was mandated under Resolution 1138 (in 1997) to enforce 21 of the provisions in the country's General Agreement, creating a proportion equal to 23.8 for Dimension I. At that same time, UNMOT was mandated to enforce three of the five security-oriented provisions in the General Agreement, creating a score of 60.00 for Dimension II, and its total level of involvement at that




FIGURE 2 Changes in Dimensions I, II, and III for UNMOT.

Note: The three dimensions of enforcement for UNMOT and Tajikistan's General Agreement are distinct from one another and vary over time.

time was 17,¹⁴ creating a score of 80.95 for Dimension III. Whereas the scores for Dimensions I and II rose in 1998 as a result of an expanded enforcement mandate, the score for Dimension III steadily dropped off from 1998 to 2000 as UNMOT adopted a more reserved, hands-off approach to the enforcement of the provisions in its mandate.

Each observation in this data set is initially made at the level of the individual mission. To merge these data with the two outcome variables, I collapse the observations down to the agreement-year and take the highest annual coding.¹⁵ Table 3 provides a descriptive summary for each measurement. Because these data are derived from mission mandates and associated documents, there is the potential for discrepancies between mandated enforcement activities and those actually carried out by missions. First is the potential for a sequencing of activities. This may undermine my argument (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) if missions prioritize the enforcement of non-security-oriented provisions. Second is the potential for missions to fail to implement enforcement activities altogether. This would lead to an underestimation of the impact of each dimension of enforcement I identify in the data.

Beyond leveraging additional reports and documents on mission activities to ensure the coding corresponds to the empirical practices of missions, there is good reason to believe that neither of these conditions bias my data in any clear direction. While it is true that missions necessarily focus on certain activities at specific periods of time, recent findings

demonstrate that missions do not sequence their activities in any coherent way (Blair et al., 2022). Additionally, if any idiosyncratic sequencing *does* arise, the level of analysis allows me to overcome any potential impacts; because mandates are usually updated, at most, annually, within-mandate sequencing would disappear before my analyses capture such biases.

Control variables and estimation

There are three primary challenges to estimating the relationship between mandated enforcement and the outcomes of interest. First, it is well known that peacekeeping missions are not deployed at random but rather are disproportionately deployed to deadlier conflicts and to countries with weaker central governments (Fortna, 2008; Gilligan & Stedman, 2003; Hegre et al., 2019). This introduces two biases: First, the deployment of missions to more difficult locations may lead me to underestimate the relationship between the dimensions of mandated enforcement and the durable end to armed conflict; second, the deployment of missions to countries with weak states may underestimate both the ability of each dimension to prevent conflict recidivism and the ability of post-conflict states to implement agreement provisions.

A unique advantage of my data is that they incorporate the full universe of comprehensive peace agreements, regardless of whether a mission was ever deployed to enforce its implementation (e.g., Mali's 1991 National Pact) or had withdrawn after a period of time (e.g., UNMIBH). The inclusion of systematic observations of no enforcement biases the results against my expectations. Nevertheless, I include three control variables that often dictate where missions are deployed: the annual total number of battle-related deaths (Davies et al., 2022),¹⁶ the Correlates of War's annual composite index of each country's material capabilities (Singer et al., 1972/2017), and measurements of the annual per capita GDP from the Varieties of Democracy Project (VDEM; Coppedge et al., 2021).

Second is the matter of nonrandomized selection into peace agreements and specific provisions. Agreements are often adopted following strategic considerations of the warring parties acting under structural conditions that make conflict less attractive (Collier et al., 2004). Agreement adoption may thus already signal that the warring parties are less committed to returning to armed conflict. This may lead to an overestimation of the effect of mandated enforcement on conflict termination.

¹⁴ For example, it was mandated to "*cooperate* with the [*dispute resolution commission*]" and "*monitor* the assembly of UTO fighters and their...*disarmament*" (UNSC 1997; italics and boldface added for emphasis).

¹⁵ This decision is in line with past research (Blair et al., 2022; Lloyd 2021).

¹⁶ For the analyses with conflict recidivism as the outcome variable (see below), I rely on the total number of wartime, battle-related deaths (Davies et al., 2022).

TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics for the three dimensions of enforcement.

Indicators	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Years with mission enforcement (per agreement)	323	3.1	3.5	0	10
Dimension I (proportion of provisions)	323	10.8	17.9	0	90
Dimension II (type of provisions-security)	323	12.9	25.2	0	80
Dimension III (Level of Involvement)	323	22.5	37.9	0	180

Note: The average and standard deviation for each dimension of mandated enforcement vary considerably.

Provisions are also unlikely to be randomly assigned to agreements, instead being selected because of the belief that they will address the proximate and distal causes of the conflict (Joshi & Quinn, 2017). Importantly, the UN plays an increasingly central role in the agreement construction process (Greig & Diehl, 2012). When involved, the UN may guide the signatories to adopt agreements with provisions that a future mission is likely to enforce, either for simplicity's sake or because of its beliefs regarding the appropriate constitution of agreements.

I include in my analyses two sets of controls that are likely to determine the nonrandom assignment of provisions, missions' mandated enforcement practices, conflict termination, and ultimately agreement adoption. First, to consider how the UN may hasten the conflict termination process (Kathman & Benson, 2019) and influence both the type of provisions in agreements and the ones that missions are ultimately mandated to enforce, I include from Clayton et al. (2021) a control for the presence of either a UN in-country body or entity established with the goal of resolving the conflict (e.g., commission, mission, or political office) during the wartime period. Second, because conflict and development levels may influence both selection into conflict termination (Collier et al., 2004) as well as the type of provisions included,¹⁷ I once again include a control for per capita GDP and the total number of annual fatalities (Pettersson et al., 2021).

Third are the determinants of mission capabilities. Enforcement is indeed a demanding task. First, missions with fewer personnel are likely to be mandated to enforce fewer provisions (Maekawa et al., 2019). The same condition applies to securing an end to armed conflict: Without sufficient personnel, missions are poorly equipped to engage in enforcement practices, thus reducing the chances that the warring parties overcome their commitment problems (Hultman et al., 2016). I therefore incorporate from Perry and Smith (2013) measurements for the average annual number of mission personnel.

Finally, Blair et al. (2022) find that the primary drivers of the failure to implement mission mandates are both increased levels of armed conflict and fragmented (larger) mandates. To consider the former, I include a control variable for the annual total number of battle-related deaths (Davies et al., 2022). Regarding the latter, because my theory focuses implicitly on the benefits of broader mandates, instances of non-implementation due to mandate enlargement bias the results *against* my expectations.

I rely on two primary analyses to test my hypotheses. First, I estimate the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation (Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a) using two-way fixed effects models.¹⁸ This provides me with two advantages. First, they allow me to consider across time and space any concerns for correlational endogeneity tied to agreement implementation; second, they allow me to mitigate concerns for contextual variation in how missions understand each dimension of enforcement. To examine any potential changes in impact over time, I include results at yearly intervals up to five and 10 years after agreement adoption, the final year of observation in PAM.

Second, I model the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict recidivism (Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b) using a Weibull survival model because it allows for an uneven distribution of the risk of failure and the effect of covariates over time (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). This is necessary because the chances of conflict recidivism are higher in the years immediately following agreement adoption (Collier et al., 2003; Joshi & Quinn, 2017). For Hypothesis 4, I consider three decomposed causal pathways in the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict termination: (1) the moderating role of peace agreement implementation, (2) the mediating role of peace agreement implementation, and (3) the combined mediating and moderating role of peace agreement implementation (Discacciati et al., 2019; VanderWeele, 2014). For these analyses, I hold each dimension of mandated enforcement, as well as the

¹⁷ For example, countries with deadlier conflicts may include additional security-oriented provisions in their agreements (e.g., military or police reform), whereas less-developed countries may include economic development provisions in their agreements.

¹⁸ All time-invariant control variables are included in the additional models in the appendices.




FIGURE 3 Relationship between each dimension of enforcement and agreement implementation. *Note:* The first dimension of enforcement is consistently associated with agreement implementation, whereas the third level of involvement is only significantly associated with agreement implementation in the early post-conflict period. Two-way fixed effects are displayed, with 95% confidence intervals.

peace agreement implementation score, at their mean values.

RESULTS

I begin with the results for agreement implementation before discussing the results for conflict recidivism. Because of their high degree of collinearity (Appendix G, p. 22), each dimension is examined individually. I report the results graphically, though the coefficient tables for all figures are provided in Appendix B (pp. 5–7).

Figure 3 presents the results for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a. As expected, the relationship between Dimension I (proportion) and agreement implementation is consistently and statistically significantly positive over time. This demonstrates that missions' mandated enforcement of a higher proportion of agreement provisions is associated with higher rates of agreement implementation; a one-unit increase in Dimension I is associated with anywhere from a .11- to .25-point increase in an agreement's implementation score. Moreover, though significant, the estimates steadily decrease over time, highlighting that higher proportions of mandated provision enforcement may be more impactful earlier in the post-conflict period.

The results for the second and third dimensions of enforcement are mixed. Though in the hypothesized direction, the results for Dimension II (type-security) are not significant at conventional significance levels ($p < .05$). In contrast, the estimates for Dimension III (level of involvement) demonstrate a significant and positive association with agreement implementation,




FIGURE 4 Predicted probabilities for the impact of Dimension I (proportion) on agreement implementation. *Note:* The predicted probabilities for agreement implementation steadily increase as the first dimension of enforcement increases.

yet this relationship only holds through the first six years after agreement adoption before steadily dropping off. Falling in line with the conclusions for the first dimension of mandated enforcement, this suggests that more direct forms of involvement in the implementation process are particularly effective in the early post-agreement period.

While the results for the first and third dimensions of mandated enforcement may appear small, the substantive impacts vary. For example, within five years of agreement adoption, the decision of a mission to increase its level of involvement by a single level for a single provision (Dimension III; e.g., from indirect to direct involvement) is associated with an increase in an agreement's implementation score by about .4. In contrast, with an average of eight provisions mandated to be enforced in the first five years following agreement adoption, the decision to mandate a deployed mission to enforce an additional provision (Dimension I) is associated with an increase in the agreement implementation score by 1.3. With the impact being greater than a one-to-one increase, this suggests a synergistic relationship. Figure 4 presents the estimated impact of Dimension I on agreement implementation at various point estimates. A movement from the mandated enforcement of 10% of an agreement's provisions to 90% of its provisions is associated with an increase in its implementation score by 20—from 57 to 77. Thus, although improvements along either of these dimensions of mandated enforcement may have an impact on agreement implementation—especially in the early post-conflict period—it may be most impactful for missions to increase the overall proportion of agreement provisions that they are mandated to enforce at any given time over, say, prioritizing the type of provisions (Dimension II) or deeper




FIGURE 5 Total, direct, moderated, and mediated impact of each dimension of enforcement on time without conflict recidivism. *Note:* The relationship between the first and second dimensions of enforcement and time without conflict recidivism, both independent and mediated or moderated by peace agreement implementation, is insignificant. Only the second dimension, when mediated by peace agreement implementation, is significant and negatively associated with the length of time without conflict recidivism.

levels of involvement (Dimension III). This finding is particularly important as the UNSC decides how to configure mission mandates to meet the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping.

Figure 5 presents the results for the accelerated failure time models estimating the total and direct impact that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on preventing conflict recidivism (Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b), as well as the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict recidivism when mediated and moderated by agreement implementation itself (Hypothesis 4).¹⁹ Though the estimated total and direct impact for each dimension are positive, as expected in Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, the results are insignificant. This suggests, in contrast to my expectations, that higher scores along any dimension of mandated enforcement do not consistently contribute to longer time periods without the return of armed conflict. Taken together with the results for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a, these findings suggest that the three dimensions of mandated enforcement do a comparatively better job at promoting agreement implementation than they do at preventing conflict recidivism.

Turning to the results for Hypothesis 4, the mediating and moderating effects of peace agreement implementation present unique findings. While the mediated effect of agreement implementation for Dimension I (proportion) and Dimension III (level of involvement) hover around zero and are insignificant, the mediated impact for the mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions (Dimension II-type) is negative and statistically significant: With an average of just under two security-oriented provisions mandated to be enforced when deployed, the decision to

include an additional security-oriented provision is significantly associated with an *increased* chance of conflict recidivism by about .15%. This suggests that the mandated enforcement of *more* security-oriented provisions is significantly correlated with an earlier return of armed conflict among agreement signatories.

While they ultimately suggest that higher levels of agreement enforcement do not reliably contribute to preventing conflict recidivism, these findings nevertheless fall in line with two conflict trends. First is the seemingly paradoxical relationship between the mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions and conflict recidivism. Rather than withdraw when conflict appears imminent, missions often receive mandates to reinforce security-oriented provisions, such as cease-fire arrangements and disarmament programs, upping their mandated enforcement levels of these types of provisions in times of instability. Indeed, evidence from the rebel resurgences and shifting mandates of the UN missions in Sierra Leone and Tajikistan (see Figure 4) at the turn of the century suggests as much.

More broadly, the largely insignificant findings across all dimensions of mandated enforcement may be capturing a second and related process: the UNSC's decision to cut back on missions' mandated enforcement activities as the agreement implementation process comes to an end and peace becomes sustainable. This appears to be true for many of the cases here: From El Salvador to Liberia, from Sierra Leone to Croatia, the proportion of peace agreement provisions that missions were mandated to enforce steadily increased over time before dropping off at the end of their tenure. At the same time, the implementation rates of their respective peace agreements began to stabilize as the threat of conflict recidivism subsided. It is during this latter period that the UNSC also began to remove the enforcement of security-oriented provisions from each mission's mandate. Even though this

¹⁹ I estimate the models using the mean values for each dimension of mandated enforcement and agreement implementation across all observations in which a mission is present. For further discussion of the analyses and the regression results, see Section B (p. 8) and Table B4 in the appendix.

ultimately produces net-null results for conflict termination, importantly, it also suggests that missions are responsive to contextual developments and that it is precisely through the mandated enforcement of agreement implementation that missions become better positioned to contribute to preventing the recidivism of armed conflict.

These results also make sense from a practitioner's standpoint. The UNSC consistently deploys missions alongside peace agreements with the stated goal of promoting peace by enforcing their implementation (United Nations, 1996, 162–163; UNSC, 1995b). However, this commitment is not sufficient on its own; although the first and second dimensions of mandated enforcement may have a positive impact on agreement implementation, these results suggest that it is ultimately up to the combatants themselves to bring an end to armed conflict (Joshi & Quinn, 2017). In this way, missions' mandated enforcement practices only extend to durable peace when the implementation activities of the agreement signatories allow it. Taken together, the results become increasingly clear: While missions may promote peace agreement implementation when they prioritize the enforcement of more provisions and engage more directly with the implementation process in the initial post-conflict period, the mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions largely impacts conflict recidivism through a dynamic relationship with agreement implementation itself.

Robustness and alternative specifications

I include in the appendix a variety of additional analyses and alternative model specifications. The results are similar to or stronger than those presented here. First, to consider endogeneity concerns further and to consider a more temporally distant relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and implementation, Appendix C (p. 9) includes analyses for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a with the first-differences values for agreement implementation; it also includes analyses for Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b with an instrumental variables approach to further mitigate bias in the relationship between each dimension of mandated enforcement and conflict recidivism. Second, Appendix D (p. 14) includes analyses for agreement implementation with lagged values of all temporally variant variables. Third, in Appendix E (p. 17), I analyze the relationship between each dimension and agreement implementation using propensity score weighting techniques for the primary confounding variables (Fong et al., 2018; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2008). Appendix F (p. 20) incorporates medium- and long-term security reforms (military and police reform) for the analyses focusing on the

mandated enforcement of security-oriented provisions (Dimension II): Hypotheses 2a and 2b (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Appendix H (p. 23) presents results for the subset of country-year observations in which missions are present. In Appendix I (p. 26), I examine the broader impacts of each dimension of mandated enforcement on fatalities. Appendix J (p. 29) presents results for a set of sensitivity analyses for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a.

CONCLUSION

While it is well known that agreement enforcement is central to peacekeeping effectiveness, existing studies have often treated (implicitly or explicitly) enforcement as a condition applied to agreements as a whole and not to their constitutive provisions. Though the UNSC often claims as much in its mission-mandate resolutions, the reality is that missions are often mandated to enforce a *minority* of agreement provisions at any point in time, and they vary significantly in both the *types* of provisions they are mandated to enforce and their *level* of mandated involvement in the provision implementation process. Failing to account for such variation risks overestimating the degree to which missions contribute to agreement implementation and preventing conflict recidivism.

In this article, I develop a theory linking the three dimensions of peace agreement enforcement—the (1) *proportion* and (2) *type* of provisions missions are mandated to enforce, alongside the (3) *level* of mandated involvement in the implementation process—to two crucial post-conflict outcomes: agreement implementation and conflict termination. To test my argument, I leverage the Peacekeeping Enforcement Dataset (Mailhot, 2023), an original time-series cross-sectional data set identifying the spatial and temporal variation in the mandated enforcement practices of *all* UN peacekeeping missions (1989–2015). The results present unique insights into the distinct impact that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on the implementation of agreements and conflict recidivism. First, I find that the mandated enforcement of a higher proportion of peace agreement provisions (Dimension I), alongside higher levels of involvement in the implementation process (Dimension III), are positively and significantly associated with agreement implementation—especially in the early post-conflict period. Second, while I find that these two dimensions of mandated enforcement are insignificantly associated with the durable end to armed conflict, the mandated enforcement of specific types of provisions (Dimension II)—here, security-oriented provisions—is negatively and significantly associated with conflict termination when mediated by the agreement

implementation process itself. As missions often seek to enforce security-oriented provisions when conflict appears on the horizon, this makes sense from a practical standpoint. Nevertheless, it ultimately implies that the mandated enforcement of peace agreements does not reliably contribute to bringing about a durable end to armed conflict. With their divergent contributions to agreement implementation and conflict termination, the three dimensions of mandated enforcement ultimately paint a more holistic picture of the role that peacekeeping missions play in peace processes.

Overall, by highlighting the unique effects that each dimension of mandated enforcement has on both the implementation of peace agreements and conflict termination, the results underscore the importance of nuance and variation across time and space in the mandated enforcement practices of UN peacekeeping missions. For policymakers, it demonstrates the potential trade-offs that missions are faced with as they consider prioritizing certain dimensions of agreement enforcement over others. Importantly, it also highlights the crucial role that agreement implementation itself plays in the relationship between enforcement and the durable end to armed conflict. Because the ability of enforcement to prevent recidivism of armed conflict ultimately relies on the commitments that warring parties make to agreement implementation, peacekeeping missions' mandated enforcement practices and peace agreements form an increasingly symbiotic relationship. Missions must focus their efforts on maximizing their enforcement of peace agreements' constitutive provisions in order to contribute effectively to the larger post-conflict peace process.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author thanks Susanna Campbell, Alex Dyzenhaus, Matthew Evangelista, Naomi Egel, Laura Huber, Gabriella Lloyd, Nina Obermeier, Sabrina Karim, Mike Kriner, Lindsey Pruett, Angie Torres-Beltran, Dani Villa, and the anonymous reviewers and editors at the *American Journal of Political Science* for providing thoughtful comments, questions, and suggestions regarding earlier versions of this article. The research for this article was supported by a U.S. Institute of Peace-Minerva Peace & Security Scholar Award. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace or the Minerva Research Institute.

ORCID

Cameron Mailhot  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9852-394X>

REFERENCES

- Bell, Christine, and Sanja Badanjak. 2019. "Introducing PA-X: A New Peace Agreement Database and Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 56(3): 452–66.
- Blair, Robert, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Hannah Smidt. 2022. "When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates?" *American Journal of Political Science* 66(3): 664–80.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, and Bradford Jones. 2004. *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. Analytical Methods for Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Clayton, Govinda, Han Dorussen, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2021. "United Nations Peace Initiatives 1946–2015: Introducing a New Dataset." *International Interactions* 47(1): 161–80.
- Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13938>.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2004. "On the Duration of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 253–73.
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, et al. 2021. "V-Dem Country-Year/Country-Date Dataset V11." Varieties of Democracy Project. <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-11/>.
- Cousens, Elizabeth M., Stephen John Stedman, and Donald Rothchild, eds. 2002. *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Davies, Shawn, Therese Pettersson and Magnus Öberg. 2022. "Organized violence 1989–2021 and drone warfare." *Journal of Peace Research* 59(4): 593–610.
- Day, Graham. 2000. "The Training Dimension of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)." *International Peacekeeping* 7(2): 155–68.
- Di Salvatore, Jessica. 2019. "Peacekeepers against Criminal Violence—Unintended Effects of Peacekeeping Operations?" *American Journal of Political Science* 63(4): 840–58.
- Di Salvatore, Jessica, Magnus Lundgren, Kseniya Oksamytna, and Hannah M. Smidt. 2022. "Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66(4–5): 924–51.
- Diehl, Paul, and Daniel Druckman. 2018. "Multiple Peacekeeping Missions: Analysing Interdependence." *International Peacekeeping* 25(1): 28–51.
- Discacciati, Andrea, Andrea Bellavia, Jane Lee, Maitreyi Mazumdar, and Linda Valeri. 2019. "Med4way: A Stata Command to Investigate Mediating and Interactive Mechanisms Using the Four-Way Effect Decomposition." *International Journal of Epidemiology* 48(1): 15–20.
- Dorussen, Han, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis. 2013. "Into the Lion's Den: Local Responses to UN Peacekeeping." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(6): 691–706.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 779–801.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.
- Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52(4): 887–917.
- Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson. 2019. "Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians." *International Organization* 73(1): 103–31.
- Fong, Christian, Chad Hazlett, and Kosuke Imai. 2018. "Covariate Balancing Propensity Score for a Continuous Treatment:

- Application to the Efficacy of Political Advertisements." *The Annals of Applied Statistics* 12(1): 156–77.
- Fortna, V. Page. 2003. "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace." *International Organization* 57(2): 337–72.
- Fortna, V. Page. 2004a. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Fortna, V. Page. 2004b. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269–92.
- Fortna, V. Page. 2004c. "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects." *World Politics* 56(4): 481–519.
- Fortna, V. Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work?* Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Gilligan, Michael, and Ernest Sergenti. 2008. "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 89–122.
- Gilligan, Michael, and Stephen John Stedman. 2003. "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5(4): 37–54.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallenstten, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615–37.
- Greig, Michael, and Paul F. Diehl. 2012. *International Mediation*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen. 2008. "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946–2007." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(5): 697–710.
- Hoddie, Matthew, and Caroline Hartzell. 2003. "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements." *Journal of Peace Research* 40(3): 303–20.
- Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 318–32.
- Hartzell, Caroline, and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. *Crafting Peace Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*. State College: Penn State UP.
- Hegre, Håvard, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Moksleiv Nygård. 2019. "Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations." *The Journal of Politics* 81(1): 215–32.
- Höglund, Kristine, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs. 2010. "Beyond the Absence of War: the Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies." *Review of International Studies* 36(2): 367–90.
- Howard, Lise Morjé. 2019. *Power in Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Huber, Laura, and Sabrina Karim. 2018. "The Internationalization of Security Sector Gender Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35(3): 263–79.
- Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2016. "United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33(3): 231–49.
- India Today. 2009. "'Prachandagate' Video Tape Smears Nepal's Peace Process." *India Today*, May. <https://www.indiatoday.in/latest-headlines/story/prachandagate-video-tape-smears-nepals-peace-process-46684-2009-05-06>.
- Jarstad, Anna, and Desiree Nilsson. 2008. "From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(3): 206–23.
- Joshi, Madhav. 2013. "United Nations Peacekeeping, Democratic Process, and the Durability of Peace after Civil Wars." *International Studies Perspectives* 14(3): 362–82.
- Joshi, Madhav, and John Darby. 2013. "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): A Database of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Their Implementation, 1989–2007." *Peacebuilding* 1(2): 256–74.
- Joshi, Madhav, SungYong Lee, and Roger Mac Ginty. 2017. "Built-in Safeguards and the Implementation of Civil War Peace Accords." *International Interactions* 43(6): 994–1018.
- Joshi, Madhav, and Jason Michael Quinn. 2017. "Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict." *British Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 869–92.
- Joshi, Madhav, Jason Michael Quinn, and Patrick Regan. 2015. "Annualized Implementation Data on Comprehensive Intrastate Peace Accords, 1989–2012." *Journal of Peace Research* 52(4): 551–62.
- Kathman, Jacob, and Michelle Benson. 2019. "Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping and Civil War Duration to Negotiated Settlements." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(7): 1601–29.
- Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. "How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243–50.
- Lloyd, Gabriella. 2021. "New Data on UN Mission Mandates 1948–2015: Tasks Assigned to Missions in Their Mandates (TAMM)." *Journal of Peace Research* 58(5): 1149–60.
- Mac Ginty, Roger, Madhav Joshi, and SungYong Lee. 2019. "Liberal Peace Implementation and the Durability of Post-War Peace." *International Peacekeeping* 26(4): 457–86.
- Maekawa, Wakako, Barış Ari, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis. 2019. "UN Involvement and Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation." *Public Choice* 178(3–4): 397–416.
- Mailhot, Cameron, Michael Kriner, and Sabrina Karim. 2022. "International Involvement in (Re-)Building Police Forces: A Comparison of US and UN Police Assistance Programs around the World." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 33(4–5): 819–45.
- Mailhot, Cameron. 2023. *Programmatic Peacebuilding: International Missions, Domestic Commitments, and Post-Conflict Reforms*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
- Matanock, Aila. 2020. "How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23(1): 357–83.
- Mattes, Michaela, and Burcu Savun. 2009. "Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(3): 737–59.
- Mattes, Michaela, and Burcu Savun. 2010. "Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 511–24.
- Perry, Chris, and Adam Smith. 2013. "Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping: A New Dataset, 1991–2012." New York City: International Peace Institute. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_trends_un_peacekeeping.pdf.
- Pettersson, Therése, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högladh, and Margareta Sollenberg. 2021. "Organized Violence 1989–2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria." *Journal of Peace Research* 58(4): 809–25.
- Quinn, Michael, T. David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses. 2007. "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence." *International Interactions* 33(2): 167–93.
- Reiter, Dan. 2009. *How Wars End*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Singer, David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965." In *Peace, War, and Numbers*, edited by Bruce Russett, 19–48. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Stanley, William. 1999. "Building New Police Forces in El Salvador and Guatemala: Learning and Counter-learning." *International Peacekeeping* 6(4): 113–34.
- Stanley, William, and David Holiday. 1997. "Peace Mission Strategy and Domestic Actors: UN Mediation, Verification and Institution-building in El Salvador." *International Peacekeeping* 4(2): 22–49.
- Stedman, Stephen John. 1997. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22(2): 5–53.
- United Nations. 1996. Yearbook of the United Nations.
- United Nations General Assembly. 1997. "A/52/219 S/1997/510." New York City: United Nations.

- United Nations Security Council. 1992a. "Resolution 729." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 1992b. "Resolution 792." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 1995a. "Resolution 1031." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 1995b. "Resolution 1035." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 1997. "Resolution 1138." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2003. "Resolution 1497." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2004a. "Resolution 1528." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2004b. "Resolution 1561." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2007a. "Resolution 1739." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2007b. "Resolution 1740." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2010. "Resolution 1924." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2011. "Resolution 2000." New York City: United Nations.
- United Nations Security Council. 2013. "Resolution 2112." New York City: United Nations.
- VanderWeele, Tyler. 2011. "Causal Mediation Analysis with Survival Data." *Epidemiology* 22(4): 582–85.
- VanderWeele, Tyler. 2014. "A Unification of Mediation and Interaction: A Four-Way Decomposition." *Epidemiology* 25(5): 749–61.
- Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin. 2015. "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327–42.
- Walter, Barbara. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51(3): 335–64.
- Walter, Barbara. 1999. "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace." *International Security* 24(1): 127–55.
- Walter, Barbara. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Walter, Barbara F., Lise Morje Howard, and V. Page Fortna. 2021. "The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace." *British Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 1705–22.
- Wang, Jianwei. 1996. "Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project: Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia." Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

How to cite this article: Mailhot, C. 2024. "How UN peacekeeping missions enforce peace agreements." *American Journal of Political Science* 1–16.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12853>